| Title | Elite Kinship Networks During Democratization: Marriage of Politics and Economy (with Tetsuji Okazaki) |
| Date | January 20, 2026 (Tuesday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | Hybrid (Building 3, 12th-floor discussion room) |
| Abstract | How do elites maintain coordination as suffrage expansion constrains their formal power? Standard theories predict suffrage expansion weakens elite cohesion, yet persistent inequality suggests elite coordination mechanisms may adapt, not dissolve. We analyze the evolution of elite kinship networks during Japan's expansion of electoral participation (1890-1927), constructing original datasets covering cabinet ministers, members of the House of Peers and House of Representatives, and business elites. Three findings emerge. First, kinship networks strengthened rather than weakened. Second, consolidation was selective—aristocrats and business elites intensified alliances while systematically excluding elected representatives. This exclusion reflected strategic choice, not aristocratic closure: business elites were equally non-aristocratic and initially isolated but integrated into the network successfully. Third, network centrality was associated with status for aristocrats and business elites but not for representatives. These patterns suggest kinship networks functioned as adaptive coordination mechanisms, revealing how informal networks enable elite persistence even as electoral participation expands. |
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| Note | Please register via the following URL for online participation: https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/hIWgc9TZRuidJu3w4mO9sQ |