| Title | Strategic Delay and Pooling in Multi-unit Dutch Auctions: Evidence from Flower Markets |
| Date | December 09, 2025 (Tuesday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | Hybrid: Building 3, 12th-floor discussion room |
| Abstract | Multi-unit Dutch auctions are widely used in perishable goods markets. This paper empirically investigates the efficiency properties of these auctions using transaction data from a Japanese flower market. We document two distinct price dynamics: "crashes," characterized by sharp price declines, and "frenzies," where multiple bidders attempt to stop the clock simultaneously. These frenzies result in random allocation among tied bidders, leading to potential misallocation of goods. Using a structural estimation framework to recover underlying bidder valuations, we perform counterfactual simulations to compare the revenue and allocative efficiency of the current mechanism against alternative auction formats. |
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| Note | Please register via the following URL for online participation: https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/hIWgc9TZRuidJu3w4mO9sQ |