| Title | The Interaction of Private and Public Disability Insurance: Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Welfare |
| Date | November 04, 2025 (Tuesday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | Hybrid |
| Abstract | I study the interaction between private and public disability insurance (DI). Using comprehensive contract data from a major German insurer combined with representative administrative and survey data, I estimate a dynamic life-cycle model of insurance, savings, and labor supply choices. I find that private DI imposes significant fiscal costs on public DI by increasing public DI claims. As public DI becomes more generous, private DI reduces welfare gains and eventually reduces welfare. Conversely, private DI can offset welfare losses from public cuts, allowing for welfare-enhancing and cost-reducing reforms. |
| Paper | Paper File |
| Slide | |
| Note | Please register via the following URL for online participation: https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/hIWgc9TZRuidJu3w4mO9sQ |