| Title | Technical Change, Task Allocation, and Labor Unions |
| Date | October 27, 2025 (Monday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | 12th floor Discussion Room |
| Abstract | We develop a general equilibrium model that combines the task approach, labor union wage setting, and search and matching frictions. We show that skill-biased technical change (SBTC) affects wage setting through changes in firms’ task assignments to high- and low-skilled workers. The effect of this task reallocation depends on the shape of the relative task productivity schedule. In our framework, SBTC can harm low-skilled workers either by reducing real wages or increasing unemployment. We illustrate the mechanisms by calibrating the model using German and French data for the periods 1995–2005 and 2010–2017, and additionally estimate the relative task productivity schedule. |
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