| Title | Peak-Load Pricing in Platform Markets |
| Date | July 22, 2025 (Tuesday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | Hybrid (Building 3, 12th-floor discussion room) |
| Abstract | We study welfare and profit impacts of peak-load pricing in the context of a dining reservation platform that allows restaurants to set variable prices. Using unique data on reservations and a measure of restaurant traffic, we estimate a model where equilib- rium prices respond to both time-varying consumer price sensitivity and restaurants’ capacity constraints. We find peak-load pricing, rather than intertemporal price dis-crimination, is the primary driver behind the observed price variation. We show that variable pricing increases social welfare by 8.6%, demonstrating the vital role of pricing in improving efficiency in the context of platform markets. We also find variable pricing can reduce the profit of the platform, which thus might lack the incentive to provide the variable-pricing technology despite its welfare benefits. Notably, this supply-side incentive misalignment is most salient when the platform and firms share their joint profit, thus offsetting the relative efficiency of profit-sharing contracts over per-unit-fee contracts. |
| Paper | Paper File |
| Slide | |
| Note | Register link for Zoom participation: https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/UCTAYxuUQheKXpINSv4yDg |