| Title | Buyer Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining: The Case of Online Japanese C2C Market |
| Date | June 24, 2025 (Tuesday) 10:40-12:10 |
| Location | Hybrid (Building 3, 12th-floor discussion room) |
| Abstract | This paper examines the design of bargaining protocols on online marketplaces, where price negotiation is becoming increasingly common. A growing concern on these platforms is the problem of unpaid items that arise when buyers fail to complete transactions after negotiated offers are accepted. Sellers often accept negotiated offers only to face delayed payments or complete non-payment. This issue stems from the lack of buyer commitment following negotiations. I aim to quantify the welfare implications of such commitment issues by addressing the question: can market welfare increase under a full commitment policy for buyers? To investigate this, I estimate a structural model of search and bargaining that incorporates the commitment issue, using data on used 64GB iPhones from Japan’s leading online C2C marketplace, Mercari. Counterfactual simulations reveal that a full commitment policy can be welfare-enhancing, primarily driven by an increase in seller welfare, as sellers can charge list prices higher than when they had to deter consumer search. |
| Paper | |
| Slide | |
| Note | Register link for Zoom participation: https://list-waseda-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/UCTAYxuUQheKXpINSv4yDg |