| Abstract |
Recent work has been interested in the effect of the marriage market on sorting in other markets, e.g., education choice, labor supply, etc. Focusing on pre-marital sorting, there is an interest in evaluating the effect of the marriage market on different forms of pre-marital investment. A difficulty in these models is that unique equilibria are not guaranteed, leading to complications when evaluating counterfactual scenarios. We first show that the canonical marriage market sorting model of Choo and Siow (2006), later generalized in Galichon and Salanié (2022), always admits a unique equilibrium even when we allow for pre-marital sorting into different individual types. We then extend the work of Chiappori, Costa Dias, and Meghir (2018) to evaluate the effect of the marriage market on educational sorting in the US between 1960 and 2000. We find that the marriage market impacts marriage differently than in their studies, impacting the estimated impact of marriage on educational sorting. |