| Title | Dissenting and Opinion Writing in the United States Courts of Appeals |
| Date | May 19, 2022 (Thursday) 16:30-18:00 |
| Location | Hybrid (Room 601 in Building 3) |
| Abstract | In appellate courts, judges strategically vote considering the costs and benefits of dissenting. I develop a model where judges take into account the effects of dissenting due to reputational concerns and the costs of writing opinions. I quantify how strategic considerations on dissenting affect voting behavior by estimating the model with data from the US courts of appeals. The results suggest the following effects of dissenting: (i) a dissenter suffers the costs of dissenting when the majority overturns the lower court's decision, (ii) a dissenter derives benefits from dissenting when the majority upholds it, and (iii) the majority gains by writing a longer opinion when there is a dissenter. Finally, I perform the counterfactual experiment to study whether judges in a panel would reach a better decision if they voted sincerely and ignored the effects of dissenting. I find that they rule a case accurately and sincere voting would not improve the performance, which implies that they have precise signals. |
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| Note | If you want to paticipate via Zoom, please register. https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJApce-sqjMiGdw28IIrWrZ02GVUo0QCkeAz |