| Abstract |
*This project is still at a very early stage; any suggestions are welcome.
Why did parliamentarians voluntarily reduce the power of parliaments in interwar Japan? How and when the business interests, which supported diplomacy and disarmament in the 1920s, came to bolster military rule? I examine the voting record, biography, electoral returns, interest group membership, and parliamentary group membership of the members of the House of Representatives in pre-war Japan (Election year: 1928, 1930, 1932, 1936, 1937, 1942), then run several difference-in-differences analyses taking advantage of exogenous shocks. The preliminary results indicate that the Great Depression in Japan (1930-31) did not change the behavior of the parliamentarians backed by business or agricultural interests, and they mostly resisted the power grab by the army. Most of the pro-army shift in the early phase took place among those politicians with journalistic, legal, or bureaucratic backgrounds. Only after the start of the second Sino-Japanese war (1937), most politicians with business interests started to support military rule. Interestingly, however, those industries that were irrelevant to the war effort (Silk, Banking, Brewery etc.) became the most fervent supporters of the military cabinet, and those that were essential for the mobilization (Shipping, Railroads, Warehouses etc.) tended to oppose the war and the military rule. It appears that those sectors that were badly hurt by the war and sanctions needed quid pro quo to receive governmental support (e.g., the silk industry got the price support from the Tojo cabinet), while those retained some bargaining power vis-à-vis the military did not want the democratic institutions to disappear.
(Network analysis with respect to the political assassinations in the early 1930s is underway.) |